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Venezuela is at risk of serious internal conflict if President Hugo Chávez continues to polarise society and dismantle the checks and balances of representative democracy after his recent landslide re-election. Venezuela: Hugo Chávez’s Revolution, the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines what that overwhelming victory in December and Chávez’s “Bolivarian Revolution” mean for one of the world’s major oil producing countries. After eight years in power and despite his repeated electoral successes, Chávez faces serious challenges: there is growing frustration with spiralling crime, government inefficiency, excessive spending and corruption, and polarisation in the body politic has reached historic proportions. There are also concerns in the region that the ex-colonel is willing to sacrifice democratic principles to advance his agenda. Under the guise of “direct” or “participatory” democracy, Chávez has progressively weakened the checks and balances of the political system. » Media Release » Executive Summary » Full Report (PDF) » International Crisis Group advierte sobre tendencias autocráticas en Venezuela, El Universal

Venezuela: Hugo Chávez’s Revolution
Media Release
Bogotá/Brussels, 22 February 2007: Venezuela is at risk of serious internal conflict if President Hugo Chávez continues to polarise society and dismantle the checks and balances of representative democracy after his recent landslide re-election.

Venezuela: Hugo Chávez’s Revolution,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines what that overwhelming victory in December and Chávez’s “Bolivarian Revolution” mean for one of the world’s major oil producing countries. After eight years in power and despite his repeated electoral successes, Chávez faces serious challenges: there is growing frustration with spiralling crime, government inefficiency, excessive spending and corruption, and polarisation in the body politic has reached historic proportions. There are also concerns in the region that the ex-colonel is willing to sacrifice democratic principles to advance his agenda. Under the guise of “direct” or “participatory” democracy, Chávez has progressively weakened the checks and balances of the political system.

“Chávez has created a regime that is not yet a dictatorship but is developing strong autocratic tendencies, has suborned the military, taken control of the judiciary and the electoral commission and passed laws that can be used to intimidate and muzzle the press”, says Markus Schultze-Kraft, Crisis Group’s Colombia/Andes Project Director. “All the levers of power can be operated by his hand and his hand alone”.

Chávez has been reconstructing Venezuela since his first election in 1998. He pushed through a new constitution that dismantled the system by which the traditional parties had dominated the country for most of two generations. The two-chamber Congress became a unicameral National Assembly, which has had only pro-Chávez members since the badly fragmented opposition unwisely boycotted the December 2005 elections. On 31 January 2007 it passed a new enabling law granting the president far-reaching legislative power for eighteen months.

Three scenarios could trouble Chávez. The likeliest is that problems will arise if oil prices drop to a point where the president cannot sustain current social spending. “If a recession imperils government funding, this could lead to more unemployment, undermining faith in the revolution and provoking an angry backlash”, says Crisis Group Senior Analyst Jeremy McDermott. It is also possible that the political opposition could eventually regain its footing, take control of the National Assembly and provide a serious alternative. This scenario could prompt diehard Chavistas to resort to violence to defend the regime. There is also a possibility that Chávez could be challenged from within his movement, as there are some disagreements over where the president is leading the country.

“If Chávez continues to build personal power at the expense of other institutions and militarise the government and political life, there will be serious risks of internal conflict, especially if the oil boom that cushions the economy falters”, says Alain Deletroz, Crisis Group’s Latin America Program Director. “Whether the social polarisation and accumulating tensions turn violent depends primarily on whether, at a moment of triumph, Chávez acts with restraint”.



Venezuela: Hugo Chávez’s Revolution
Latin America Report N°19
22 February 2007

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
After eight years in power, President Hugo Chávez won an overwhelming re-election in December 2006. Flush with oil revenues, bolstered by high approval ratings and at the start of a six-year term, he expresses confidence about advancing what he calls his Bolivarian Revolution, named after Simón Bolívar, the country’s independence hero, and installing his still only vaguely defined “Socialism of the 21st Century”. There are concerns in Venezuela and much of the hemisphere, however, that to do so the ex-colonel and one-time coup leader may be willing to sacrifice democratic principles. He is not yet a dictator and for the most part has not tried to act in a dictatorial manner, but the trend toward autocracy is strong. If he continues to build personal power at the expense of other institutions and militarise much of the government and political life, there will be serious risks for internal conflict, especially if the oil boom that cushions the economy falters.

Crisis Group will examine subsequently what the Chávez phenomenon means for regional and hemispheric politics. This report concentrates on what has changed in the country’s institutional landscape, politics and economics. Chávez has been reconstructing Venezuela since his first election in 1998. A year after that success he pushed through a new constitution that dismantled the condominium of traditional parties that had dominated the country for most of two generations, replacing it with a “participatory” democracy founded on the notion of the president’s direct relationship with the people. The two-chamber Congress became a unicameral National Assembly, which, since the badly fragmented opposition unwisely boycotted the December 2005 legislative elections, has had only pro-Chávez members.

Traditional checks and balances on executive power have all but disappeared as key state institutions, such as the attorney general’s office, the Supreme Justice Tribunal, the electoral council and the armed forces, have progressively come under the control of the president and his loyalists, with military officers, active duty and reserve alike, filling many normally civilian offices. Large social service programs, termed “missions”, have been launched in poor neighbourhoods and helped gain popular support for the government. State control of the economy, not just the vital oil sector, has increased, as has pressure on opposition media and NGOs.

Polarisation in the body politic has reached historic proportions, with traditional elites and many among the middle class opposing these profound changes in a series of elections and in the streets. During his first five years of power, Chávez faced several attempts to unseat him, both constitutionally and unconstitutionally. In April 2002 and late 2003, he weathered first a coup then a prolonged national strike, while in August 2004 he emerged victorious from a recall referendum. Boosted by the referendum victory and high oil prices, he has been on the offensive ever since. In January 2007, the National Assembly passed with little debate an enabling law granting the president far-reaching legislative powers for eighteen months.

The political opposition is marginalised for now, as much by its own feuds as anything Chávez has done to restrict its ability to operate. Nevertheless, serious challenges are ahead. Excessive government spending has built up the debt, and inflation is the highest in the hemisphere. If oil prices fall further and production of the state-owned oil company, PDVSA, goes down, generous, ideologically-driven social programs will need to be cut. Discontent is rising over public sector corruption and skyrocketing crime and drug trafficking. Inflation-driven uncertainty is aggravated by the appearance of some food shortages in stores and markets.

The proliferation of armed groups also could become troublesome. Many Chavista groups, particularly in Caracas, have access to weapons, while additional government-established groups like the Frente Francisco Miranda, a civilian organisation made up of young people sent to Cuba for ideological training, are due to receive them. The National Reserve and Territorial Guard, created under Chávez, are outside the normal military chain of command, answerable directly to the president. There is concern that some of the armed groups could transform into criminal mafias. Chávez will also need to bridge widening fissures within his own camp about the direction in which his revolution should go.

Whether the social polarisation and accumulating tensions turn eventually into violence depends primarily on whether at a moment of triumph Chávez acts with restraint, in particular to:
• limit use of the far-reaching powers granted him by the National Assembly so as to avoid further damage to institutional checks and balances, and respect Venezuela’s obligations under the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the American Convention of Human Rights and other international human rights treaties;
• guarantee the full functioning of an attorney general, comptroller general and ombudsman independent of the executive, as designed in the 1999 constitution;
• increase efforts to improve the medium to long-term sustainability of social and infrastructure programs by attacking inflation and fiscal deficits and avoiding excessive state control of the economy; and
• halt the proliferation across the country of armed groups beyond control of the regular military and the professional police forces.

Bogotá/Brussels, 22 February 2007



International Crisis Group advierte sobre tendencias autocráticas en Venezuela
El Universal, 22 de Febrero de 2007
Bruselas.- Las tendencias autocráticas del presidente Hugo Chávez sitúan a Venezuela en "riesgo serio" de caer en un conflicto interno, que se vería agravado si disminuyeran los ingresos del sector petrolero, según un informe difundido hoy por el International Crisis Group.

Esta organización no gubernamental dedicada al análisis de conflictos en todo el mundo coincide en que, tras su reelección en diciembre pasado, Chávez continúa polarizando a la sociedad venezolana, al tiempo que desmonta los mecanismos de control del sistema democrático, indicó Efe.

El informe explica que, después de ocho años en el poder, el dirigente venezolano tiene que afrontar la creciente frustración social por la alta criminalidad que vive el país, la ineficacia del Gobierno y la corrupción, y el distanciamiento de las distintas facciones políticas.

Hace hincapié en que, con el disfraz de la democracia "directa" o "participativa", Chávez está debilitando progresivamente los mecanismos de control del sistema político.

"El régimen chavista no es todavía una dictadura, pero muestra fuertes tendencias autocráticas", asegura el responsable del International Crisis Group para la región Colombia/Andes, Markus Schultze-Kraft.

"Todos los niveles del poder están en manos de Chávez, y sólo en sus manos", recalca este analista.

El informe denuncia que instituciones clave, como la Fiscalía General, el Tribunal Supremo, el Consejo Nacional Electoral y también las Fuerzas Armadas han ido cayendo bajo el dominio exclusivo del presidente y sus más leales seguidores y que oficiales militares ocupan puestos tradicionalmente reservados a civiles.

Alude también a los programas sociales denominados "misiones", que están permitiendo a Chávez ganar apoyos entre los más pobres, así como al creciente control de la economía, no limitado al sector petrolero, y a la presión cada vez mayor sobre los medios de comunicación y las ONG críticas con su gestión.

La coyuntura económica, destaca el informe, se está complicando, con un gasto desbocado que engrosa la deuda pública y la inflación más alta del subcontinente.

También muestra preocupación por la presunta proliferación de grupos armados, como el Frente Francisco de Miranda (una organización civil compuesta por jóvenes formados en Cuba), pero también la Guardia de Reserva Nacional y Territorial creada por Chávez, independiente del estamento militar.

Según el International Crisis Group, algunos de estos grupos pueden acabar convertidos en mafias criminales.

Vista la situación, esta ONG cree que pueden producirse varios escenarios. Lo más probable, en su opinión, es una bajada del precio del petróleo hasta un nivel que no permita al Gobierno mantener el actual ritmo de gasto público, lo que conduciría a incrementos del desempleo y reduciría la confianza popular en la "revolución bolivariana de Chávez".

El informe tampoco descarta el fortalecimiento de la oposición política a Chávez, que podría hacerse con el control de la Asamblea Nacional y convertirse en una verdadera alternativa.

Por último, señala que la contestación a Chávez puede surgir de su propio movimiento, donde ya empieza a detectarse cierto desacuerdo sobre la orientación política del presidente.